Reputational bidding by Giovannoni, Francesco & Makris, Miltiadis
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Giovannoni, Francesco and Makris, Miltiadis  (2014) Reputational bidding.   International Economic
Review, 55  (3).   pp. 693-710.  ISSN 1468-2354.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12067





Francesco Giovannoni1 Miltiadis Makris
Reputational Bidding
Abstract
We consider auctions where bidders care about the reputational e¤ects of their bidding
and argue that the amount of information disclosed at the end of the auction will inuence
bidding. We focus on bid disclosure rules that capture all of the realistic cases. We show that
bidders distort their bidding in a way that conforms to stylized facts about takeovers/licence
auctions. We rank the disclosure rules in terms of their expected revenues and nd that, under
certain conditions, full disclosure will not be optimal. First-price and second-price auctions
with price disclosure are not revenue equivalent and we rank them.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we investigate a class of auctions where bidders have reputational concerns. We
consider auctions where a single, indivisible object is for sale in the standard independent private-
values (IPV) setting. To this setting, we add reputational concerns for bidders by assuming that
each bidder has a payo¤-relevant type which is correlated with the bidders valuation of the object,
with both being her private information. One example is that where bidders are managers of rms
in an auction for some takeover target and each bidders type is her quality as a manager. This
quality is correlated with her valuation because higher quality managers are better at extracting
value from their acquisition or because they have more expertise in determining the valuation
itself. Whenever managerial quality a¤ects the managers private valuations of the takeover
target, bidding behavior will provide a signal of the managers quality to a future job market for
managers. Consequently, managers bidding behavior will be a¤ected by how much of the bidding
process will be publicly disclosed at the end of the auction. We restrict attention to the cases
where (a) auctions are either sealed-bid or descending for any number of bidders, or ascending
(with the auction stopping when there is only one remaining bidder willing to buy) with two
bidders,2 and (b) the (labor) market after the auction has ended is perfectly competitive.3
2As we shall see, reputational incentives introduce issues that are reminiscent of those found in common value
auctions. Thus, information released during an ascending auction with more than two bidders is important for the
bidding behavior of remaining bidders. By excluding this case, we focus on the implications for bidding behavior of
information released at the end of auctions. Nevertheless, we note that our results regarding over- or under-bidding
(Proposition 3) would still hold in such setting.
3Of course, an environment where the post-auction market is imperfectly competitive and/or there is a common-
value component in the bidders valuations is worth investigating for a full understanding of reputational bidding
but we view this as a starting point that claries the crucial role of various disclosure rules in an otherwise standard
setting.
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Di¤erent auctions may imply di¤erent kinds of bids-disclosure and this will have a decisive
impact on bidders incentives. For example, if a bidders valuation is very low, then in a Dutch
auction it is unlikely to be disclosed, whereas it would be certainly disclosed in a (sealed-bid)
auction where all bids are disclosed at the end of the auction. We focus on four di¤erent disclosure
rules. For each of these rules, the identity of the winner and of the bidders whose bids are revealed
are always disclosed, as it would be natural in most conceivable applications. We have disclosure
rule A (for all), where all the bids are revealed; disclosure rule N (for none) where none of
the bids are disclosed; disclosure rule W (for winner) where only the winning bid is disclosed
- as in Dutch auctions - and disclosure rule S (for second) where only the highest losing bid
is disclosed, as in a second-price sealed-bid auction where the price is disclosed. Conditional on
revealing the winners identity, other disclosure rules are still possible but we believe the rules
above cover all the realistic cases. For the case of two bidders, these are all the possible cases.
Our analysis begins by characterizing Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria in pure strategies
where bidding functions are symmetric and strictly increasing. We show that bidding functions
are analogous to the ones in the absence of reputational incentives, after using what we call the
bidders e¤ective valuations in the place of their valuations. These e¤ective valuations take into
account reputational e¤ects and depend on the disclosure rule. This analogy implies revenue
equivalence for auctions with di¤erent price mechanisms, but the same disclosure rule.
We then proceed to show that in this framework, for any disclosure rule, bidders will over- or
under- bid depending on their reputational incentives. Therefore, recalling our example, in an
environment where high valuations are perceived as signals of high managerial quality, managers
with career concerns may consciously decide to bid too much.4 Further, we rank the di¤erent
4Burguet and McAfee (2009) argue that too much optimism on the value of the licenses might be at the heart
of excessive bidding in telecommunication auctions, but our theory provides an alternative explanation that does
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disclosure rules in terms of their expected revenues to the seller, conditional on the existence of
symmetric and strictly increasing equilibria. The following are important consequences:
1. When bidders wish to be perceived to be as high (respectively low) a type as possible, a
simplistic intuition might suggest that full revelation (respectively no revelation) of bids
is expected-revenue maximizing. We show that this intuition is correct only under certain
(su¢cient) conditions. When these conditions are not satised, the disclosure rule that is
revenue maximizing might actually be the opposite of the one basic intuition would suggest.
2. First-price sealed-bid auctions where only the price is disclosed (or Dutch auctions) and
second-price sealed-bid auctions where only the price is disclosed (or ascending auctions
with two bidders), utilize di¤erent disclosure rules. The former is a W auction, while the
latter is a S auction. We show that their expected revenues di¤er and can be ranked. This
is of particular interest given that it is common practice to disclose only the price and that
in the standard framework without reputational concerns revenue equivalence obtains.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and
Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 characterizes equilibrium bidding functions and dis-
cusses expected revenues for given disclosure rules. Section 5 focuses on a comparative analysis
of disclosure rules. Section 6 discusses the results and applies them to a couple of stylized models
of licence auctions and corporate takeovers. Section 7 concludes and discusses future research.
Most of our proofs are relegated to an appendix.
not require that bidders/managers systematically overestimate the value of their acquisitions.
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2. Related Literature
There is a literature that deals with cases where reputational e¤ects distort bidding behavior.
Goeree (2003), Haile (2003), Das Varma (2003), Salmon and Wilson (2008) focus on the com-
parison of various price mechanisms for a given disclosure rule whereas our main focus is on
the comparison between various disclosure rules. Moreover, our revenue equivalence result for
a given disclosure rule generalizes similar results in these papers for a wider range of disclosure
rules.
The closest paper to ours is Katzman and Rhodes-Kropf (2008) but there are three important
di¤erences. First, they only consider - in terms of our terminology - second-price S auctions versus
rst-price and second-price W auctions. We consider A,W,S and N auctions and emphasize
that for a xed disclosure rule, revenue equivalence obtains, thus showing that it is disclosure
rules and not price mechanisms that a¤ect expected revenues from a given auction. The second
important di¤erence is that in Katzman and Rhodes-Kropf (2008) the external incentives matter
just for the winner while in our set-up bidding has reputational e¤ects regardless of whether
a bidder has won or lost the auction, as is natural in a signaling context. The nal di¤erence
stems from the fact that, in our paper, reputational e¤ects arise through a return that accrues
to bidders after the conclusion of the auction (whether they have won or lost) through their
interaction with a third party. This implies the time-additive separability in the payo¤s between
returns from the auction and reputational returns. This separability is not present in Katzman
and Rhodes-Kropf (2008) (and in all the other papers cited above), as the payo¤ gross of the
price paid in the auction accrues all in one instance in the future. The last two di¤erences
lie behind the di¤erence in the revenue rankings between rst-price and second-price auctions
where only the price is disclosed (in our notation, W and S auctions respectively). Katzman
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and Rhodes-Kropf (2008) cannot pin down an unambiguous result, while we can rank them (see
Proposition 4II and 4III).
The paper by Molnar and Virag (2008) assumes additive separability between valuations and
reputational payo¤s, despite the fact that, similarly to the aforementioned papers, the payo¤
gross of the price paid in the auction accrues all in one instance in the future. There are still
three major di¤erences with their setting. First, in their paper, the question is one of optimal
mechanism design, whereas we focus on standard auctions with realistic disclosure rules. Second,
in their setting reputational incentives matter only for the winners. The nal di¤erence is that
in our paper we have a more general formulation of the utility functions. A major implication
is that in their framework W or N auctions always dominate S auctions whereas this is not
necessarily the case in our set up (again, see Proposition 4II and 4III).
Our main contribution to the literature on auctions is therefore to provide clear revenue
rankings for all realistic disclosure rules in a context of pure reputational concerns where both
winners and losers have reputational incentives. This is crucial if one wishes to understand
bidding behavior in licence auctions or corporate takeovers.
3. The Model
We consider N bidders indexed by i = 1, ..., N who bid for a single unit of an indivisible object
(or asset) and supply their services (or labor) in a perfectly competitive market that opens
after the conclusion of the auction and the possible publication of (some of) its outcomes. All
participants in this competitive market take information-contingent market-clearing wages as
given and bidders supply their labor/services to future employers/rms at these wages. We
assume free entry and exit of potential future employers, that the number of potential future
employers is larger than N and that the reservation wage of bidders is zero. To simplify the
6
narrative we refer to any such post-auction interaction as the after-market.
We assume that bidders are risk neutral, have no budget constraint and face time additively
separable utilities. We represent bidder is (expected) valuation for the object (or asset), with
a realization xi ∈ [x, x] ≡ X ⊂ R+, of the random variable Xi, with all the Xi distributed
identically and independently across bidders according to the cdf FX with a strictly positive
density fX which is continuously di¤erentiable. A crucial element of our model is the function
V (.), since V (xi) represents the returns from the bidders services in the after-market if it was
publicly known that her realized valuation is xi. We assume that V (.) is common knowledge,
while the bidders valuations are their private information. We further assume that V (.) is
strictly monotone and twice continuously di¤erentiable.5 It will sometimes be convenient to refer
to the random variable Vi = V (Xi), with typical realization vi and density (almost everywhere)
fV (vi). Let y = maxj 6=i {xj} be the highest expected valuation amongst is competitors, which
is distributed according to the cdf G(y) ≡ FN−1X (y). Furthermore, y2 = maxj 6=i ({xj} /y) is the
second highest expected valuation amongst is competitors. Let L (y2|y) ≡ Pr (Y2 ≤ y2|Y = y) .
The timing of events is as follows. First, an auction takes place. Then, some information
(discussed below) about submitted bids and identities of corresponding bidders is publicly dis-
closed. Given this information, the after-market opens. Thus, when strategies are such that ties
are zero probability events - which will be the case in the equilibria we will focus on - the payo¤
of bidder i given bids b = [b1, ..., bN ] is
(3.1) Pr[bi > max
j 6=i
{bj}](xi − p(b)) + δωi(b)
Here, Pr[bi > maxj 6=i {bj}] and p(b) denote, respectively, the probability of bidder i winning the
object and the price paid upon winning given bids b. In addition, δ > 0 represents the discount
5Given the compactness of X, our assumptions on fX and V imply that both are bounded and with bounded
rst derivatives. In addition, V must have a bounded second derivative.
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factor (which is a measure of career concerns), and ωi(b) denotes the expected wage earned in
the after-market given bids b. If the true valuation xi was known to the after-market, then (with
some abuse of notation) ωi(b) = V (xi). In general, however, the expected wage will depend
on the information that will be publicly disclosed at the end of the auction and the associated
inferences of the after-market.
We will focus, throughout the paper, on symmetric and strictly increasing Perfect Bayesian
Nash Equilibria in pure strategies, which we will refer to simply as equilibria. Restricting
attention to symmetric equilibria follows the usual practice in the literature when the auction
is symmetric as in our setup. Symmetric and strictly increasing equilibria are the only ones
capable of guaranteeing e¢ciency in the sense of allocating the object for sale to the bidder
with the highest valuation. Aside from this e¢ciency-driven motivation, we restrict attention to
strictly increasing equilibria because we can show that for small enough and positive values of the
discount factor, these are the only pure strategy symmetric PBN equilibria that may exist. Such
equilibria will be represented by a strictly increasing bidding function β(xi). We analyze Perfect
Bayesian equilibria rather than Bayesian Nash equilibria (as standard in the literature), because
we need to impose credible restrictions on the after-markets beliefs after equilibrium play in the
auction. Regarding o¤-the-equilibrium path beliefs we make the following assumption, which we
can show is compatible with the Universal Divinity renement introduced by Banks and Sobel
(1987).6
Assumption A (Beliefs) Let β (•) be an equilibrium of the auction under consideration. We
assume that in any such equilibrium, any bid lower than β (x) is believed to come from
6Existence of strictly increasing, symmetric, pure strategy PBNE is discussed in Section 5. Proofs of non-
existence of other symmetric, pure strategy PBNE and the fact that assumption A satises Universal Divinity are
available upon request.
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type xi = x and any bid higher than β (x) is believed to come from type xi = x. Further,
if there is a bid b and a type bx such that b ∈  limxi→bx− β (xi) , limxi→bx+ β (xi) then b is
believed to come from type xi = bx.
Assumption A allows us to associate to each vector of bids b a corresponding vector z of
types, which we refer to as announcements.7 Throughout the paper, we will assume that at
the end of any auction, the identity of the participants and the identity ι of the winner are
common knowledge. However, we will allow for the possibility that not all bids are disclosed. We
represent this by assuming that, in equilibrium, individual i will expect that by submitting an
announcement zi, while everyone else reports her valuation truthfully, i.e. z−i = x−i, a subset
φ (zi,x−i) ⊆ (zi,x−i) of the announcements and the identities of the bidders who have submitted
them will also be publicly disclosed at the end of auction. We will use the label φ to identify a
particular disclosure rule and will refer to auctions with the disclosure rule φ as φ auctions.
Thus, in our set up, φ (zi,x−i) (plus the identities of the corresponding bidders and the winner) is
the only information that is relevant to the after-market. In particular, for disclosure rule φ = A,
where all the bids are revealed, A (zi,x−i) = (zi,x−i); for disclosure rule φ = N , where none of
the bids are disclosed, N (zi,x−i) = {∅}; for disclosure rule φ =W, where only the winning bid
is disclosed, W (zi,x−i) = max{zi,x−i}; for disclosure rule φ = S, where only the highest losing
bid is disclosed, S (zi,x−i) = max{zi,x−i|j 6= ι}.
8
7That is, with zi such that β
−1(bi) = zi if bi ∈ β (Xi), zi = x if bi < β (x) , zi = x if bi > β (x) and zi = bx if
bi ∈ (limx→bx− β (x) , limx→bx+ β (x)) .
8Clearly, for A andW auctions the information on the identity of the winner is redundant as it can be recovered
from the available information on bids and their corresponding bidders. However, for S and N auctions, it is not
redundant. Results for these two auctions would be a¤ected if the identity of the winner was not publicly disclosed.
For instance, in N auctions, not knowing also the identity of the winner would imply that the beliefs of the after-
market coincide with the priors. We nd the assumption that the winners identity is publicly disclosed quite
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Let
M (y) = EFX [V (Xi)|Xi > y]
Λ (y) = EFX [V (Xi)|Xi < y]
Given any equilibrium bidding function β, we have that in A auctions, the after-markets beliefs
are that is type is zi. Thus,
ωAi (b) = V (zi)




V (zi) dG(y) +
Z x
zi
Λ (y) dG (y)
because if i loses, then the winning bid reveals the winners type to be y and thus the after-
markets beliefs are that is type is below y, while if i wins then the after-markets beliefs are
that is type is zi. In N auctions, the only information available is whether i has won the auction








For S auctions, we have that if i wins, y is revealed and the expected wage earned by i conditional
on y is M (y). However, if i is not the winner, then i may either be the second-highest bidder
(in which case zi is revealed) or below the second-highest bidder (in which case y2 is revealed).










V (zi)dL (y2|y) +
Z x
zi
Λ (y2) dL (y2|y)

dG(y)
We leave this section by denoting with vφι (y, zi) the reputational returns of bidder i conditional
on winning and with vφ−ι(y, zi) the reputational returns of bidder i conditional on losing. when
natural to make, as it is satised in many real world auctions.
10




vφι (s, zi)dG(s) +
Z x
zi
vφ−ι(s, zi)dG(s), φ = A,W,N ,S
Simple inspection shows that the functions vφ are twice di¤erentiable in each argument.
4. Equilibrium Bidding Functions










where p(zi, y) = β (zi) in a rst-price auction and p(zi, y) = β (y) in a second-price auction. We






























We call ψφ(xi) the e¤ective valuation for bidder i with valuation xi who faces a disclosure
rule φ.
E¤ective valuations can be obtained by maximizing the payo¤ of typical bidder i, (4.1), in a
second-price auction, with respect to her announcement and requiring zi = xi at the optimum.
Ψφ(xi, zi) is the net welfare gain to a bidder of type xi from winning (gross of payments) relative
to the increase in the probability of winning, after increasing the announcement marginally over
zi, when the disclosure rule is φ. An e¤ective valuation is such net welfare gain evaluated at
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equilibrium. The component vφι − v
φ
−ι captures the net reputational gain to the bidder from
winning the auction, while the remaining term in the square brackets captures the additional
reputational net gain from marginally increasing the announcement.
For example, compare the e¤ective valuations in the A and W auction cases. It is easy to see
that:




ψW(xi) = xi + δ







In A auctions, other bidders behavior has no impact on reputational returns and this is immedi-
ately apparent in the fact that vAι −v
A
−ι = V (xi)−V (xi) = 0. On the other hand, withW auctions
winning or losing does matter for inferences about xi because if i wins then xi becomes known,
while if i loses then the after-market believe xi to be below the highest competing announcement




−ι(xi, xi) = V (xi)−Λ (xi) .
In addition, we have the reputational gain/loss (relative to the increase in the likelihood of win-
ning the auction) from increasing marginally the perception of the after-market about bidder is
type by means of increasing bidder is announcement marginally. For both A and W rules this
relative gain/loss is always Vx (xi) /g (xi) but the di¤erence between A and W auctions is that
with the former bids are always disclosed, while with the latter, such gain/loss only applies when
i wins, which occurs with probability G (xi) .
For our other disclosure rules, we have that9
ψS (xi) = xi + δ

M (xi)− V (xi) +
1− FX (xi)
fX (xi)
[Vx (xi) + (N − 2)Λx(xi)]

(4.4)
ψN (xi) = xi + δ [EG [M (Y )]− EG [Λ (Y )]](4.5)
To state our rst result we need the following two assumptions:
9Calculating ψS(xi) is not so straightforward, and the details are available upon request.
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This condition requires that marginal reputational incentives for the lowest type be bounded
and is a necessary condition for the existence of equilibrium for A auctions when N > 2, because
in such auctions the lowest type will be revealed in equilibrium. By contrast, it is redundant for
N , S and W auctions, where the lowest type is never revealed in equilibrium. Assumption B
and our assumptions about V (x) guarantee that e¤ective valuations are well-dened, bounded





Given Assumption B, a su¢cient condition for ψφ(x) ≥ 0, whatever the disclosure rule, is
that x is su¢ciently high. We then have:
Proposition 1 Assume A, B and C hold. If ψφ(xi) is strictly increasing, then:
1. The equilibrium in second-price sealed-bid auctions with a disclosure rule φ, βFP−φ, is
given by
βSP−φ (xi) = ψ
φ(xi), x ∈ [x, x]
2. The equilibrium in rst-price sealed-bid auctions with a disclosure rule φ, βSP−φ, is given
by
βFP−φ (xi) = EG
h
ψφ(Y )|Y < xi
i
, x ∈ [x, x] .
10For N = 2, ψφ(x) is necessarily well dened, given our assumptions, in particular, that fX(x) > 0. However,
for N > 2, we will have that g(x) = (N − 1)FX (x)
N−2 fX(x) = 0. It is in those cases that ψ
φ(x) should be
interpreted as limxi→x+ ψ
φ (xi) .
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Proof Follows familiar steps and is available upon request 
It is immediate to see the similarity between this result and that for the basic IPV set up since
the only di¤erence is that bidders use their e¤ective valuations rather than their valuations. Two
issues arise from the proposition above. The rst is that ψφ(xi) or EG

ψφ(Y )|Y < xi

are not
guaranteed to be strictly increasing. The second is whether, conditional on equilibrium existence,
revenue equivalence between standard price mechanisms still obtains in our set-up.
We briey take up the equilibrium existence issue in Section 5 below, but with respect to the
second issue, we can show that:
Proposition 2 Consider a disclosure rule φ. Any equilibrium of any auction such that (a) the
highest bidder wins, (b) no information about bids becomes public during the auction,11 and (c)
the expected payment of a bidder with the lowest valuation is zero, yields expected revenue to














2 is the cdf of the random variable Y
(N)
2 that represents the second-highest type
amongst all bidders.
Proof. Follows familiar steps and is available upon request 
Since e¤ective valuations depend on φ, Proposition 2 implies that standard auctions with
the same price mechanism but di¤erent disclosure rules may have di¤erent expected revenues.
Below, we investigate bidding functions in more detail and revenue rankings of disclosure rules.
5. Bidding Distortions and Revenue Comparisons of Disclosure Rules
We start with a property of e¤ective valuations:
11Recall footnotes 2 and 3.
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Proposition 3 Whenever Vx > 0 for all x ∈ (x, x), then ψ
φ (x) > x for all x ∈ (x, x), and
ψφ(x) ≥ x and ψφ(x) ≥ x, for all disclosure rules φ ∈ {N ,A,W,S} . Conversely if Vx < 0 for all
x ∈ (x, x).
Proof. Follows directly from the denitions of e¤ective valuations andM(x) and Λ(x) above

This proposition simply states that if the reputational returns when ones bid is revealed in
equilibrium, V (xi), are strictly increasing (respectively strictly decreasing) in xi, we then have
that with any of our disclosure rules here, there is almost everywhere overbidding (respectively
underbidding). The reason is that bidders want the after-market to believe their valuations are
high (respectively low).12
In our set up, existence of equilibrium is not guaranteed for all disclosure rules because the
standard incentives when participating in an auction may conict with reputational incentives.
Existence is guaranteed for N auctions: in this case the bidding functions are as in the standard
IPV framework up to a constant. In addition, recall from (4.2)-(4.5) that e¤ective valuations have
two additive components, the rst of which is the standard valuation.13 Therefore, the bidding
function is strictly increasing when δ = 0. This implies directly that, for the rest of the disclosure
rules, since reputational components have bounded rst derivatives, there is a range for small
enough and positive discounting factors for which an equilibrium exists, under both rst- and
second-price auctions. Furthermore, we can provide, for any discount factor, su¢cient conditions
for equilibrium existence in both rst- and second-price auctions with any N for disclosure rules
W and A, and with N = 2 for S auctions. These conditions are described in Proposition A1, in
12We say almost everywhere, because the only cases when there is no over/under-bidding for a type xi are when
(i) xi = x, φ = A and limxi→x+ Vx (xi) /g (xi) = 0, or (ii) xi = x and φ =W or (iii) xi = x and φ = S.
13That is, we have ψφ(x) = x+ δ eψφ(x), where eψφ(x) is the reputational component.
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the appendix.14 Assuming thus existence of equilibrium, we compare next the various disclosure
rules in terms of expected revenues in such equilibria. Denote by ER (φ) the expected revenue
associated with a specic disclosure rule φ. The proposition below summarizes a complex list of
results which we report in full in the appendix.
Proposition 4 [summary] Assume existence of equilibrium. Then:
I For large enoughN , ER (A)−ER (N ) > 0 (respectively < 0) whenever Vx > 0 (respectively
< 0)
II Whenever Vx > 0 for all x ∈ (x, x), then ER(S) > ER(W). Further, if N = 2 then
ER(A) = ER(S) while if N > 2 then ER(A) > ER(S)
III Whenever Vx < 0 for all x ∈ (x, x), then ER(S) < ER(W). Further, if N = 2 then
ER(A) = ER(S) while if N > 2 then ER(A) < ER(S)
IV ER (W) − ER(N ) is positive (respectively zero, negative) if fV is strictly increasing (re-
spectively constant, strictly decreasing).
Proof See Appendix 
Given that reputational incentives lead to overbidding (respectively underbidding) when being
perceived to be of a higher (respectively lower) type is favorable to the bidder, one might be
tempted to think that the more information is disclosed, the more overbidding (respectively
underbidding) one should expect and consequently, more (respectively less) expected revenue.
This is not true if, for example, FX(x) = U [0, 1], V (x) = x
4/4 and N = 2 because ER (N ) −
14Among other things, Proposition A1 implies that existence for second-price φ auctions implies existence for
rst-price φ auctions. Moreover, when Vx > 0, existence for second-price A auctions implies existence for second-
price W auctions and conversely when Vx < 0.
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ER (A) = 7/16 − 13/30 = 1/240 > 0. Thus, even if Vx > 0, more disclosure leads to less
revenue.15 To understand why this may be, we focus on the case Vx > 0 as an entirely symmetric
argument applies for the case Vx < 0. Recall that disclosure rules provide reputational incentives
in two ways. The rst reputational incentive is the one that gives us the simple intuition: if
more bids are disclosed, more bidders are likely to see their type disclosed in equilibrium, and so
reputational incentives to overbid increase. There is, however, also a reputational incentive that
comes from the simple di¤erence between winning and losing the auction because it may provide
clues to each bidders type. A auctions and N auctions are very di¤erent because the former
generate only the rst reputational incentive (knowing someones bid is all you need to recover
their type in equilibrium), while the latter generate only the second reputational incentive. There
are no simple necessary and su¢cient conditions that guarantee that one incentive dominates
the other, but Proposition 4 does provide a simple set of su¢cient conditions. Of course, being
only su¢cient, if these conditions are not satised, the reverse may occur.16
In an N auction, the reputational incentives are bounded above by maxx (M (x)− Λ (x)).
The reputational component of expected revenues from A auctions is N (EFX (V (X))− V (x))
which is strictly increasing and unbounded in N. Intuitively, what happens is that any bidder,
from a reputational perspective, faces the same potential gains from having her type revealed
no matter how many other bidders there are, and so the reputational component of expected
payments from a given bidder is a constant. Of course, then, the reputational component of
expected revenues increases by this expected payment whenever there is an additional bidder.
This explains part I of Proposition 4.
15 In the appendix, the proof of Proposition 4 provides the relevant formulas to make this a straightforward
calculation. Note also that in this example, fV is strictly decreasing.
16For example, if V (x) = x10/10 thenN auctions generate more expected revenue than A auctions for 2 ≤ N ≤ 5.
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Regarding the comparison between A and S auctions, in parts II and III of Proposition 4,
we note that when Vx > 0, with disclosure rule S bidders with low valuations have a stronger
relative incentive to overbid in equilibrium than under φ = A. The reason is that low types will
be rewarded by their bid not being disclosed in case they win; such an additional incentive does
not exist for A auctions. Our result shows that the di¤erence in incentives between disclosure
rules cancel out in expectation when N = 2, whereas for N > 2 they work in favour of disclosure
rule A.17 Conversely, if Vx < 0.
With regards to the comparison between φ = S and φ =W, the two types of auction reveal
exactly one bid each, yet our results suggest that reputational incentives are stronger in the
former. Low valuation bidders have a higher chance of being the highest loser than the winner
while the di¤erence between the probability of being the winner or the highest loser is not so
signicant for high valuation bidders. Thus, low valuation bidders have proportionately higher
incentives to distort their bids in S auctions.
In part IV, we complete our comparisons by considering N and W auctions. Consider the
case where fV is strictly increasing and Vx > 0. In this case, high realizations of x are more likely
than low realizations. Also, in N auctions overbidding is constant in x while in W auctions high
types overbid more than low types. Thus, a distribution of valuations that puts more weight
on high realizations than low ones will have a greater impact on revenue in W auctions than on
revenue in N auctions. Obviously, if fV is strictly decreasing the reverse obtains.
18
17More specically, when N > 2, a very low type knows that her type is still unlikely to be revealed in an S
auction while very likely when N = 2, and so the incentives to overbid are smaller for the former case. Thus, it
is not surprising that the di¤erence in expected revenues between A auction (where reputational incentives for a
given bidder are constant in N) and S auctions (where they are strictly decreasing in N) is strictly increasing in
N.
18The intuition for the cases where Vx < 0 follows along similar lines, if one recalls that in this case we have
underbidding and that fV strictly increasing (respectively, strictly decreasing) now implies that high realizations
18
6. Discussion
Proposition 4 and the analysis above give us the opportunity for several corollaries which we
summarize next.
In the previous section we emphasized the ex-ante trade-o¤s that an auctioneer must confront
when choosing a disclosure rule. Thus, when Vx > 0, a government that mainly wants to
guarantee an e¢cient allocation of an asset it owns and sells might prefer N auctions, but when
fV is strictly increasing, equilibrium existence is not a problem for A auctions and bidders are
expected to play such equilibria, a government that puts a lot of emphasis on revenue generation
will choose A auctions.
Secondly, Proposition 4 highlights that full disclosure may be dominated by other disclosure
rules. When Vx < 0, A auctions are revenue dominated by auctions with disclosure rules W,S
and, when fV is strictly decreasing, N . Quite surprisingly, this may also be possible when Vx > 0,
as long as fV is strictly decreasing and N is not too large, as the example immediately below
Proposition 4 demonstrates.19
Finally, consider a rst-price and a second-price sealed-bid auction where only the price, the
corresponding bidder and winner are disclosed. The former is a W auction while the latter is a
S auction. Thus, from Proposition 4, whenever Vx > 0 (respectively Vx < 0) for all x ∈ (x, x)
and an equilibrium exists, the second-price auction generates more (less) expected revenues than
the rst-price auction. The linkage principle - obtained for single-object auctions by Milgrom
and Weber (1982) - has been broadly interpreted as implying that more public information raises
revenues. This corollary here could be interpreted, as a failure of such interpretation of the
of x are less (respectively, more) likely.
19By the same token, Proposition 4 claries that in the presence of under-bidding, no transparency may not be
revenue maximizing either, as N auctions may be dominated by W auctions, for example.
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linkage principle in an environment where valuations are independent but there are reputational
e¤ects.20
6.1. Licence Acquisitions and Corporate Takeovers (I)
We apply our ndings to an example motivated by recent telecommunication auctions and cor-
porate takeovers. Bidders are the rms managers who have career concerns and are involved
in the takeover of another rm or licence acquisition.21 Managers are trying to determine the
value of the target/licence for their rm and higher ability managers are those more capable of
asset evaluation. To model this, we assume that for each bidding rm, the private valuation is
wi.
22 This valuation is unknown to everyone and rm is manager receives a private signal θi
on it. How good a signal this is depends on the managers quality γi. We follow Ottaviani and
Sorensens (2006) multiplicative linear experiment by assuming that all these random variables
20For a similar argument in multi-unit sequential auction with unit-demands and interdependent types/signals
see Mezzetti, et al. (2008).
21 It is well worth emphasizing that in the example we explicitly interpret bidders as agent-managers working
on behalf of a principal (the owners/shareholders). This raises the issue of whether shareholders have possible
explicit incentives in place to counteract the implicit incentive of signaling to the after-market. Depending on
the available instruments, shareholders might be able to alleviate the e¤ects on prots of their managers implicit
incentives. We do not model the possibility of explicit counter-incentives but our discussion remains valid as long
as implicit incentives cannot be completely eliminated. This seems to be a realistic assumption as any explicit
contract designed for counter-incentives would have to be able to quantify and verify precisely how much bidding
was distorted. For a similar argument, see Maldoom (2005, pp. 582).
22Börgers and Dustmann (2005, pp. 557) argue that in the context of the UK 3G auctions, the assumption
of private valuations is reasonable as...all relevant information had already reached the public domain and that
no rm had important insider information, except for information that concerned only its own situation, with no
immediate relevance for other rms.
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are dened on the unit interval, and that the joint density is given by














fW (wi) fΓ (γi)
where fW and fΓ are well-dened densities of the true valuation and managerial ability, respec-
tively, and positive everywhere in their supports. This captures the idea that with probability γi
the signal θi is informative about wi, while with probability (1− γi) the signal is pure noise.
Denote with xi = X(θi) the expected valuation of bidder i after having observed the signal
θi, which can be shown to be strictly increasing. We also dene here V (xi) to be the expected
quality of bidder i conditional on her having observed a signal X−1(xi). If we assume that the
density fW has mean  6= 1/2 and variance ξw, while the density fΓ has mean τ and variance ξγ ,
then the multiplicative linear experiment can be shown to imply that
V (xi) = τ −
ξγ (2− 1) (− xi)
2τξw
fV (vi) = 2
ξ2γ










where 1[vL,vH ] (vi) = 1 if vi ∈ [vL, vH ] and 0 otherwise. V (xi) is strictly increasing in xi whenever
 > 1/2 and strictly decreasing in xi whenever  < 1/2.
Thus, in this context, a high signal (or expected valuation given monotonicity of X(.)) is
interpreted as high expertise when  > 1/2 and as low expertise when  < 1/2.23 Therefore,
inferences about managerial ability depend on prior beliefs about wi. When these are optimistic
(i.e.  > 1/2), a high expected valuation xi also leads to the inference of a high γi because it
conforms to the prior beliefs. Conversely, when prior beliefs are pessimistic (i.e.  < 1/2). For
us, this is reminiscent of the discussion of bidding behavior in recent telecommunication auctions.
23Note that if  = 1/2, then for any θi the after-market would not be able to make any additional inferences
about the managers own expertise, which is why we do not allow for this case. Formally, if  = 1/2, then the
conditional on signal density of ability is equal to the unconstrained density fΓ (γi) .
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Many have argued for the presence of overbidding because there was a lot of hype about the value
of these licences.24 In the context of our example here, the pre-auction hype could be interpreted
as an optimistic prior belief on the part of the after-market. Under the multiplicative expertise
model, this would lead to the inference that a high (expected) valuation is also an indicator of
high managerial ability and our model would predict overbidding. Here managers do not overbid
because they are too optimistic, but in order to pander to the publics optimistic beliefs. Finally,
given that fV is strictly increasing, Proposition 4 implies:
ER(A) ≥ ER(S) > ER(W) > ER(N ) if  >
1
2
ER(W) > ER(S) ≥ ER(A) and ER(W) > ER(N ) if  <
1
2
where weak inequalities become equalities for N = 2 and strict inequalities for N > 2.
6.2. Licence Acquisitions and Corporate Takeovers (II)
Consider again the takeover of a targeted rm but assume that the ability/quality of the rms
managers a¤ects their valuation of the target. This would typically be the case when the winning
bidders manager will be in charge of the newly acquired rms.
To model this, we assume that for each bidding rm, the private valuation of the takeover
target is known to the bidder, and for bidder i equals xi. We also assume that this valuation is
a strictly increasing function of the quality γi of the bidding rms management: xi = X (γi).
25
24For instance, Burguet and McAfee (2009).
25For example, we could have that the valuation for rm i is a function of the managers quality γi and of some
intrinsic characteristic s of the target. This characteristic s inuences all bidders valuations equally, but no bidder
has specic private information about it since due diligence leaves all perspective buyers relatively well informed.
Thus,
xi ≡ X (γi) =
Z ∞
−∞
h (s, γi) fS (s) ds
where h (•) is a function common to all bidders and strictly increasing in γi, while s is a common value component,
22
This might be because the bidding rm and the takeover target will have complementary assets.
For example, the bidder may be a large pharmaceutical conglomerate bidding for a small biotech
rm that has produced a new drug. The logic behind the takeover is that the bidder can bring
in its marketing, sales and regulatory expertise which are beyond the biotech rms ability. So,
the bidders valuation represents its managements ability to make the most of the new drug.26
Let us now identify here the quality of manager i, Γi, with the variable Vi introduced in Section
3 of the paper; that is, fV (vi) ≡ fΓ (γi) and X
−1(xi) ≡ V (xi). We then have that V (xi) is
strictly increasing, due to the assumed properties of X(.). Thus, recalling Proposition 4, revenue
rankings in this model depend on the properties of fV .
Andrade, et al. (2001) provide evidence that rms overbid in takeovers and mergers, while
Yim (2013) surveys the previous literature and provides evidence that younger CEOs are more
keen to do takeovers and mergers. She argues that higher career concerns for younger CEOs
must be involved, because managers get rents from strictly increasing the size of their rms.
Our theory suggests that career concerns may be behind overbidding behavior, but rather than
arguing that rents are involved, we show that bidding managers send signals about their ability
to future potential employers through such takeovers.27 In particular, the result in Proposition
independent of γi, with its density fS assumed to be common knowledge.
26Rhodes-Knopf and Robinson (2008) argue that takeovers and mergers most often arise because of the sort
of complementarities described above. One can, however, conceive of cases where the acquiring rm has been
unsuccessfully trying to develop a product for a market and nally decides to give up and to obtain instead a
better product by acquiring a smaller but more successful competitor. Microsofts decision to bid for Yahoo after
unsuccessful attempts to develop its own portal can represent such a case. In such situations, the assets of the two
rms are substitutes and we should expect a strictly decreasing X(.).
27Note that our theory does not necessarily predict overbidding. Indeed, the example here describes both a
scenario where one would expect overbidding and one where one would expect underbidding. Further, the (ego-)
rents theory does not predict that bidding distortions will depend on specic disclosure rules, while our theory
23
3 suggests that in takeovers managers will tend to overbid whenever the assets of the bidding
rms and the target are complements.
7. Conclusions
This paper studies auctions where bidders have reputational concerns. We show how disclosure
rules and not price mechanisms are crucial in this context and discuss the relative implications of
using di¤erent disclosure rules for maximizing the sellers expected revenue. Also, these results
shed some light on the perceived overbidding that has occurred in telecommunication auctions
and corporate takeovers in the past.
Future research should consider a more complex environment where the job market for man-
agers/bidders benchmarks a managers type with that of another. Therefore, a bidders reputa-
tional returns would depend on the expected valuations of other bidders as well, even in the case
where the after-market was certain post-auction of the bidders expected valuations.
Also, a crucial assumption in our model is that the after-market is aware of the identity of
the bidders. With endogenous participation, such assumption would no longer be warranted and
it would be interesting to examine how reputational concerns would a¤ect it.
University of Bristol, U.K.; University of Southampton, U.K.
8. Appendix: Proofs
Throughout the proofs, we remove the subscript i whenever there is no risk of confusion. Also,
monotonicity statements should be understood in the strict sense. The following Lemma will be
used extensively in proving our results.
does. All these di¤erences are potentially testable, but such a task is beyond the scope of the current paper, and
is left for future research.
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Lemma 1 If Vx(x) > (<) 0, for any x ∈ (x, x), then Λx(x) and Mx(x) > (<) 0.








The lemma then follows directly from the fact that if Vx(x) > 0 for any x ∈ (x, x), then M(x) >
V (x) > Λ(x), and vice versa 
Proposition A1 Suppose assumptions A, B, and C hold. Let GV = (FV )
N−1 and GV =
(1− FV )
N−1
1. Whenever Vx > 0 for all x ∈ (x, x), then equilibrium for W (respectively A) second-price
auctions is guaranteed if GV is log-concave (respectively i¤ GV is concave).
2. Whenever Vx < 0 for all x ∈ (x, x), then equilibrium for W (respectively A) second-price
auctions is guaranteed if GV is log-convex (respectively i¤ GV is convex).
3. If Vx > 0 and N = 2, then equilibrium for W, S and A second-price auctions is guaranteed
if 1− FX (x) is log convex and V (x) is convex.
4. If Vx < 0 and N = 2, then equilibrium for W, S and A second-price auctions is guaranteed
if FX (x) is log convex and V (x) is concave.
5. For any disclosure rule, an equilibrium in a rst-price auction is guaranteed if an equilibrium
exists in a second-price auction.
Proof. Available upon request 
We now provide a complete statement and proof of Proposition 4. The order of the statements
is somewhat di¤erent from the main text because it is convenient to follow the order below in
the proof.
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Proposition 4 (complete) Assume equilibrium existence. Then:
I ER (W)−ER(N ) is positive (respectively zero, negative) if fV is increasing (respec-
tively constant, decreasing)
II Whenever Vx > 0 for all x ∈ (x, x) then
a.
ER (A)− ER (W) > 0;ER(S)− ER(W) > 0
ER (A)− ER (S) > 0 if N > 2 while ER (A)− ER (S) = 0 if N = 2
b. For large enough N , ER (A)− ER (N ) > 0.
III Whenever Vx < 0 for all ∈ (x, x) then all the inequalities in II are reversed.
Proof. Given our bidding functions are separable between a non-reputational component
and a reputational component, and given that the former is the same across disclosure rules, we
can restrict attention to the reputational component of expected revenue for each disclosure rule.
This is dened as gER (φ) . It will also prove convenient to consider an additional disclosure rule
NW, where all bids are disclosed except for the winners. This disclosure rule is not of particular
interest per se (although NW and S are equivalent for N = 2), but it will prove useful in the
proofs. Indeed we begin our analysis, with the following:
Lemma 2 Assume equilibrium existence. Then:
gER (A) = gER (NW)
Proof. It is easy to show that















dG (y) dFX (x)












[V (x)− V (y)] dG (y) dFX (x) .
So,
















V (s) dFX (s)










V (s) dG (x) dFX (s) = 0
as desired 
I. We will need rst to prove the following: if V (•) is increasing or decreasing, then M(x)−
Λ(x) has the opposite monotonicity of fV . To prove this, note rst from Jewitt (2004) that
EFX [X|X ≥ x]− EFX [X|X < x] has the opposite monotonicity of fX . Note now that if V (•) is
increasing, with ν ≡ V (x), then M(x) − Λ(x) ≡ Mv (ν) − Λv (ν) and so M(x) − Λ(x) has the
opposite monotonicity of fV . Conversely, if V (•) is decreasing thenM(x)−Λ(x) = Λv (ν)−Mv (ν)
and since dv/dx < 0 by assumption, we have then that the monotonicity of M(x) − Λ(x) has
the same sign as the monotonicity of Mv (ν)− Λv (ν) and thus the opposite monotonicity of fV .
Given this, we compare expected revenues for disclosure rules φ = W versus φ = N . We know
from Lemma 2 that gER (NW) = gER (A). This means that
gER (W) = gER (W) +gER (NW)−gER (A) = Z x
x




So, we have that
gER (W)−gER (N ) = Z x
x



















(Mx (y)− Λx (y)) dy.








(Mx (y)− Λx (y)) dy < 0 a.e.
So, we have, after recalling our result above on the properties of Mx (y)−Λx (y) thatgER (W)−
gER (N ) > 0(=, <)0 if fV is increasing (uniform, decreasing).
IIa (and corresponding III).
We provide the proof by comparing EG

ψφ(Y )|Y < x

across for the relevant rules for A vs
W and for NW vs. S. This establishes, together with Lemma 2, that for FP auctions with V
increasing, A provide higher revenues than W and S respectively. For the comparison between
S and W, on the other hand, our result only applies to expected revenues. We begin with the
comparison between A and W.
EG
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Vx (y) dG (y) =
Z x
x
V (y) dG (y) + (1−G (x))V (x)− V (x) ,












Λ (y) dG (y) +
Z x
x
V (x) dG (y)− V (x) .
Clearly, if V (•) is increasing then V (x) > V (x) and Λ (y) > V (x) for any x, y > x, and
conversely if V (•) is decreasing. The result follows directly.
28
Now we consider the comparison between A and S. Given Lemma 2, this requires a compar-
ison between NW and S.
EG


















[Vx (y) + (N − 2)Λx (y)]

dG (y)





Vx (y) dG (y) =
Z x
x
V (y) dG (y) + (1−G (x))V (x)− V (x)









V (y) dG (y) + (N − 1)





V (y) (1− FX (y)) dFX (y)
N−2

Finally, from Lemma 1,
Z x
x
(N − 2)Λx (y)
1− FX (y)
fX (y)
dG (y) = (N − 1)
Z x
x











[Vx (y) + (N − 2)Λx (y)]

dG (y)
= (1−G (x))V (x)− (N − 1)



















2 (y)− V (x)
The above is positive for Vx > 0 since then V (x) > V (x) and Λ (x) > V (x) for any x > x.
Conversely if Vx < 0.
Finally, we focus on the comparison between S and W.
Recall that




[M (y)− Λ (y)] dG (y) dFX (x)
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from above. Now,





Λ (y)− V (y) +
1− FX (y)
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gER (S)−gER (W) = Z x
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Λx (s) ds > 0
with the rst inequality above being true if Vx > 0 and hence (from Lemma 1) Λx > 0. The last
equality follows from integration by parts. The argument is symmetric if Vx < 0.The above proves
the result for N > 2. Note that if N = 2, however, then Lemma 2 implies that ER(A) = ER(S).
IIb (and corresponding III) . We know that
gER (A) = N Z x
x
[V (x)− V (x)] dFX (x) and gER (N ) = Z x
x
[M (y)− Λ (y)] dFN−1X (y)
The rst integral is clearly positive and unboundedly increasing in N, if V (•) is increasing.
Conversely, if V (•) is decreasing. For the second integral, if V (•) is increasing, thenM(y) > Λ(y)
almost everywhere, and hencegER (N ) is bounded from above bymaxy{M(y)−Λ(y)}. Conversely,
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